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Abstract
Having decided to focus attention on the “weak link”
of human fallibility, a growing number of security re-
searchers are discovering the US Government’s regula-
tions that govern human subject research. This paper dis-
cusses those regulations, their application to research on
security and usability, and presents strategies for negoti-
ating the Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval pro-
cess. It argues that a strict interpretation of regulations has
the potential to stymie security research.
1 Introduction
As more security researchers turn their attention to usabil-
ity and other human factors issues, many are surprised to
discover that they must comply with regulations govern-
ing the use of human beings as experimental subjects.
These regulations, known collectively as “The Com-
mon Rule,” were created after a series of well-publicized
abuses in the 1960s and 1970s. These regulations require
those working with US Government funds to receive ap-
proval from their organization’s designated Institutional
Review Board (IRB) before most research involving hu-
man subjects can commence.
There seems general understanding among researchers
that hands-on laboratory usability experiments are cov-
ered under the IRB rules. But many other kinds of less-
invasive research may still require IRB notification and
approval. Furthermore, it appears that many researchers
either do not understand their legal obligations, or else
have simply chosen to ignore them.
While this paper concerns itself solely with US law,
there are “approximately 900 laws, regulations, and
guidelines that govern human subjects in 84 countries,
as well as from a number of international and regulation
organizations”[12]. A list can be found in the reference.
2 Legal Framework
2.1 45 CFR Part 46 Subpart A
The National Research Act (Pub. L. 93-348) created the
National Commission for the Protection of Human Sub-
jects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research. This Com-
mission identified a set of ethical principles, and later
practical guidelines, for US Government-funded research
involving human beings. Ultimately the Department of
Health and Human Services wrote and adopted a set of
regulations requiring recipients of USG funding to cre-
ate their own institutional bureaucracies for overseeing re-
search that involves human subjects. These regulations,
embodied in Title 45 Part 46 subpart A of the Code of
Federal Regulations, exist for one purpose: to safeguard
the welfare of human research subjects.
Although CFR 45 Part 46 applies only to work funded
by HHS, regulations with the same language were adopted
in 1991 by 14 other grant-giving USG agencies, including
the Department of Defense (DoD), the National Aeronau-
tics and Space Administration (NASA), and the National
Science Foundation (NSF). For this reason 45 CFR part
46 subpart A is referred to as “the Common Rule for the
protection of human subjects”[13].
2.2 The Institutional Review Board (IRB)
The Common Rule requires organizations performing
federally supported research to designate an institutional
review board (IRBs) to oversee human subject research.
Many organizations fulfill this requirement by establish-
ing their own IRBs. Each IRB must have “at least five
members” with different backgrounds so that it can “ad-
equately review [the] research activities commonly con-
ducted by the institution”(§46.107 (a)). Members must
include representatives of both genders, at least one scien-
tist and one non-scientist, and one member who is not af-
filiated with the institution(§46.107(b,c,d)). Members are
prohibited from voting on their own research(§46.107(e)).
2.3 IRB Coverage
The Common Rule is very clear: With the exception of six
specific categories of research, the Common Rule “applies
to all research involving human subjects conducted, sup-
ported or otherwise subject to regulation.. . . ”(§46.101(a))
Research is defined as “a systematic investigation, in-
cluding research development, testing and evaluation, de-
signed to develop or contribute to generalizable knowl-
edge” (§46.102(d)). Human Subject is defined as “a liv-
ing individual about whom an investigator (whether pro-
fessional or student) conducting research obtains 1) Data
through intervention or interaction with the individual, or
2) Identifiable private information”(§46.102(f)).
The IRB regulations allow organizations to augment the
rules, adding requirements, and broadening them to in-
clude more areas of research(§46.112). At many schools,
including MIT[8], Harvard[11] and UC Berkeley[3], IRB
approval is required for any research involving human
subjects, regardless of funding, and even if the research
is exempt under the Common Rule.
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2.4 IRB Exemptions
The Common Rule contains exemptions for some re-
search involving human beings. For security research the
relevant exemptions are:
• Research to be conducted on educational practices or
with educational tests(§46.101(b)(1&2)).
• Research involving “existing data, documents, [and]
records. . . ” provided that the data set is either “pub-
licly available” or that the subjects “cannot be identi-
fied, directly or through identifiers linked to the sub-
jects”(§46.101(b)(4)).
• Research involving “survey procedures, interview
procedures or observation of public behavior,” un-
less information is obtained that could identify the
human subjects, and “any disclosure of the response
outside the research could place the subjects at risk
of criminal or civil liability or be damaging to the
subjects’ financial standing, employability, or repu-
tation”(§46.101(b)(2)(i&ii)).
Few Organizations allow investigators to decide if their
own research is exempt under the guidelines—that would
create a conflict-of-interest. For example, Harvard re-
quires that “all research using human subjects” to be “re-
viewed or designed as exempt from review by a Harvard
Institutional Review Board”[11]. In practice, all requests
at Harvard to involve human subjects in research goes to
a staff member at one of the Harvard IRBs; the staff then
decides if the research is actually exempt or in need of
review.
2.5 IRB Myths and Facts
Below are some popular myths about IRBs and the Com-
mon Rule that are apropos to computer security research.
Myth: Because the Common Rule exempts research
involving subjects that cannot be identified, IRB ap-
proval is not required when using anonymized data
Although this would certainly be convenient, most institu-
tions only allow a determination of exemption to be made
by the IRB itself.
Myth: “Pilot studies” do not require IRB approval.
Although some schools have policies which define a kind
of “pilot study” not requiring IRB approval, there is no
support for this interpretation in the Common Rule, which
makes no reference to “pilot” or “preliminary” studies.
Many universities (e.g. [15, 9, 4]) have specific lan-
guage in their IRB guidelines stating that IRB approval is
required for all research, even pilot studies that will not
be published. Georgia State University’s policy[9] goes
further, requiring consent forms to indicate if a study is a
pilot study and requiring that the experimenter obtain ad-
ditional IRB approval when the study progresses beyond
preliminary stages.
But some organizations allow unapproved pilot studies:
the School of Social Service Administration at University
of Chicago allows small-scale pilot studies with less than
10 individuals to proceed without IRB approval assum-
ing that “proper steps will be taken to protect human sub-
jects,” sensitive data will not be collected, vulnerable pop-
ulations will be excluded, and methods with no more than
minimal risk will be used. However, SSA/UC requires
IRB approval if the data collection in the pilot study will
be used in any publication; if the data is to be used, IRB
approval is required before data collection begins[5].
Myth: IRB approval is not required if you are work-
ing with data you already have. The Common Rule
makes no such exception. If previously collected data will
be analyzed using a methodology that is different than that
which was described in the original IRB application, new
approval may be required.
Fact: IRB approval is not required by the Com-
mon Rule when using publicly available data. The
Common Rule states that research involving the “col-
lection or study” of “existing data, documents [or]
records” is exempt “if these sources are publicly avail-
able” §46.101(b)(4). But, as previously noted, most insti-
tutions require IRB approval for all work involving human
subjects, even research exempt under the Common Rule.
3 Research Implications
The Common Rule places security researchers in a diffi-
cult position: Large quantities of data in our possession or
which are easy to get appears to be off-limits for research
without prior IRB approval.
3.1 Scenarios
In this section we present seven scenarios of usability &
security research projects that potentially use human sub-
ject data and which could not have been anticipated when
the Common Rule was drafted. We will briefly describe
each one; in the following section we’ll discuss whether
or not the scenario would require IRB approval.
Scenario 1: Security toolbar with anonymized sum-
mary statistics. Alice has developed an anti-phishing
toolbar. To assist in development and research, the tool-
bar sends a small anonymized report to the experimenter
once a day. Because each toolbar reports only once ev-
ery 24 hours, it is easy for the experimenter to measure
adoption and use of the toolbar.
Scenario 2: Web server logfile analysis. Bob’s re-
search group operates a popular web-based discussion fo-
rum. Bob writes a program which analyzes the web-
server’s log file to report the number of daily password
resets. He also instruments the software to record the
number of newly chosen passwords that do not pass the
website’s password complexity rules. The research plan
is to see how these numbers change as the rules become
successively more restrictive over time. To assure that
no personally identifiable information is collected, Bob
configures the Apache server so that IP addresses are not
logged.
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Scenario 3: Popular security search terms. Christine
is a graduate student who also writes articles for a ma-
jor security-related website. She is working on a project
that correlates search terms on the website with news sto-
ries. The security-related website prepares a report which
shows, for each hour, the number of times each term is
searched. The report is sent as a PGP-encrypted file to
Christine’s Gmail account.
Scenario 4: Building better spam filters. Don is cre-
ating a better spam filter and wishes to test it on his own
inbox.
Scenario 5: Wi-Fi Security Survey. Elaine installs a
copy of NetStumbler on a laptop and drives around the
neighborhood with a GPS. She compares the names and
locations of the Wi-Fi sites with a similar database avail-
able online. Her research shows that most of the older
Wi-Fi access points that were open are now either closed
or have been removed from service. Of the new Wi-Fi
access points that have been deployed, most are closed.
Scenario 6: Hidden Data Survey. Guy writes a web
crawler and downloads 100,000 Microsoft Word files
from public websites. He analyzes the files and finds that
approximately 15% contain significant amounts of hidden
information. He randomly chooses 100 of the 15,000 files
to confirm her software’s findings.
Scenario 7: Online EXIFs. Felicity downloads 10,000
JPEGs from a social network website. By examining
the camera serial numbers in the images he is able to
determine which images were shot by the same cam-
era. She then shows that he can reconstruct the “friends”
networks—and shows which pseudonyms are sharing the
same camera, indicating that they might be living together
or might be the same person.
3.2 Analyzing the Scenarios
Scenarios 1, 2, 3, and 4 clearly require IRB approval under
the Common Rule:
1. Alice needs IRB approval because she is recruiting,
interacting with, and collecting information from her sub-
jects. Furthermore, her users reveal their IP address when
the toolbar reports its statistics; although IP addresses
do not necessarily reveal personal information, they fre-
quently do—especially in a university environment where
an address may be assigned to a specific person.
2. Even though Bob is not collecting IP addresses, he
still needs IRB approval because the information in the
webserver logs was generated by human subjects and is
not publicly available.
3. Likewise, Christine requires IRB approval because
the data is generated by human beings and is not publicly
available. Christine could avoid IRB involvement if the
security website published the search terms on a public
web page rather than encrypting them and sending them
to her Gmail account. (Although it seems that this creative
way to bypass the Common Rule has exactly the opposite
of the desired effect, presumably the website would do its
own privacy audit before releasing such information.)
4. Don has thousands of legitimate and spam messages,
but the Common Rule prohibits him from analyzing in-
coming email without IRB approval.
The other scenarios are more troublesome:
5. Elaine might not require IRB approval for his sur-
vey because she is not observing people: She is observing
wireless access points. But these devices were configured
(or not configured) by people. And in some rural areas the
GPS coordinates might identify specific individuals.
6. Guy’s research with Word documents literally in-
volves “existing . . . documents” that are “publicly avail-
able,” so it should be exempt under the Common Rule.
But the documents might have been inadvertently placed
on the Internet and contain private information.
7. Felicity’s research, like Guy’s, probably does not
fall under the Common Rule if she only collects docu-
ments (e.g., the photographs) that are publicly available.
But what if the images were available to a large commu-
nity but not the general public?
3.3 Researcher’s Can’t Say “Trust me”
Although researchers might be frustrated by the conclu-
sions of this analysis, it is important to realize that the
Common Rule is doing precisely what Congress intended
when it passed the National Research Act: Congress
wanted to put a stop to scientists saying “trust me.” For
decades, scientists had argued that good scientific practice
and ordinary research ethics would protect the interests of
their subjects. Experience proved otherwise.
With the National Research Act, Congress concluded
that some scientists were not worthy of trust when it came
to evaluating the impact of their own experiments on ex-
perimental subjects. And with good reason: some re-
search involving human beings frequently requires decep-
tion, stress, or bodily risk. The Act recognizes that it
is sometimes unreasonable to ask a scientist to be both
an advocate for their research and their research subjects
well-being.
For example, Alice could data mine her logfiles, seek
out the personally identifiable IP addresses, perform
Google searches to correlate IP addresses with email ad-
dresses, and then create a web page that identifies people
who have “good” security practices (because they run her
program) and “bad” practices (because they uninstalled
her program.) Perhaps she might even send phishing at-
tacks to the subjects to see how they respond. The IRB
structure provides a place for someone who has had train-
ing to review her research protocol.
There are many ways to “anonymize” log files: some-
times the anonymization is incomplete and personally
identifiable information can be recovered. One reason to
require IRB review of research involving “anonymized”
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logs is so that a neutral third-party can review protocol.
Otherwise, we are just trusting the good judgement of
the researcher—a person who has an inherent conflict-of-
interest.
The analysis in Don’s case seems silly: after all, Don
already has the email messages, and they were voluntar-
ily sent to him by his friends and colleagues. But those
people didn’t send Don the email for the purpose of be-
ing involved in an experiment. Part of the IRB process
is to protect human beings who are involved in research
without their knowledge or consent.
Since each of the scenarios above involve no more than
minimal risk, we believe that an IRB would properly ap-
prove each protocol under the Common Rule’s “expedited
review procedures”(§46.110). At many organizations the
expedited review involves a form that is submitted by
email and is administratively approved within days by ei-
ther the IRB chair or a staff member. Although it appears
to be a formality, expedited review has an important role:
it forces the experimenter to create a written description of
the research protocol. The mere act of writing down the
protocol and discussing it with the IRB may help the ex-
perimenter to realize ways to further minimize the impact
of the experiment on the human participants.
3.4 The Human Test
One useful test of the need to involve an IRB is to ask this
question: would the experiment be useful if the data were
generated by a random process and not by a human? For
scenarios #2 and #3 above, the answer would clearly be
“no.” The only reason that our hypothetical Bob is inter-
ested in reviewing password rule violations, and Christine
is interested in search terms is precisely because this in-
formation is being generated by human subjects. If the
passwords and search terms were randomly chosen, the
research would not be worth doing.
If the experiment can be performed with randomly gen-
erated data, then use random data. This is an application
of the “respect for persons”[2] ethical principle.
4 Working with the IRB
It is widely believed that different IRBs apply different
standards when deciding whether or not to approve com-
puter security research. This is likely a result of IRBs
having different levels of experience with this kind of re-
search.
We suggest several approaches that security researchers
can take to improve the situation with their IRBs:
• Researchers should be intimately familiar with both
the Common Rule and whatever local regulations
their home institutions may have adopted.
• Researchers must learn how to make clear and co-
gent arguments that their research should be ap-
proved under the “expedited review procedures” on
the grounds that there is “minimal risk” to the exper-
imental subjects.
• IRBs have the authority to waive informed consent
requirements (§46.116(c,d)). Researchers should be-
come familiar with this option and request it where
appropriate.
• Researchers should be familiar with protocols that
have been approved by other IRBs. The research
community would also benefit from having an open
repository of approved protocols.
• Security researchers should volunteer to serve on
their organization’s IRBs. Bringing security exper-
tise to the IRBs in this manner will help educate other
IRB members and ease the way for other security re-
search involving human subjects. (We have heard
stories of IRBs that have blocked membership of
computer scientists on the grounds that they were not
biomedical researchers and the position on the IRB
reserved for a non-scientist was already taken. Such
positions are a misreading of the Common Rule,
which specifies minimums but not maximums of IRB
membership(§46.107)).
5 IRB “Mission Creep”
IRBs are centers of power: they have the ability to shut
down research, and they operate with little institutional
supervision. There are also complaints that IRBs have be-
come more restrictive, in some cases acting as if their pur-
pose is to safeguard their institutions from lawsuit, rather
than to protect the welfare of experimental subjects. Per-
haps as a result, some researchers have complained of a
pervasive IRB “Mission Creep,” in which more and more
research is being placed under the purview of IRBs.
In November 2005 the Center for Advanced Study at
the University of Illinois College of Law held a confer-
ence on the topic of “IRB mission creep” and produced
a 32 page paper, based on a two-year study, stating that
IRBs were being stretched thin by being forced to pay
excessive attention to research that poses little chance of
risk. The report also called for “removing some kinds of
activity from IRB review altogether,” especially journal-
ism and ethnography[1]. The authors later published an
editorial in Science making many of the same claims[10].
Journalism is particularly a problem, the Illinois group
argued, because people who are the subject of journalistic
research are frequently injured by the results. The exam-
ple they give is that of President Richard Nixon, whose
reputation was damaged and who lost his job as the result
of the Watergate investigation. Although this research had
great social value, it might not have been permitted by an
IRB.
Katz argues that the Common Rule turns ethnographers
into “IRB Outlaws” when they perform fieldwork by liv-
ing with a host community to learn about it. The very
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premise of field work is that results cannot be predicted,
so it is impossible to get approval in advance from an IRB
for what might happen[14]. Recently an entire issue of
American Ethnologist was devoted to this topic[7].
A growing number of observers have criticized IRBs
for being research censorship instruments. Cohen writes
that an IRB that he sat on, which was primarily comprised
of health care professionals, “received a qualitative, so-
cial science project to review. The IRB promptly disap-
proved it because it wasn’t science in the view of the IRB
members”[6]. The protocol was eventually approved, but
only after Cohen convinced the IRB to send the proposal
out for external review.
6 Conclusion
Some might say that this call for IRB involvement in com-
puter security research is part of IRB Mission Creep. But
the Common Rule, as written, clearly applies to much
work in the field of usability, psychology and security.
The problem here is that the Common Rule was writ-
ten to cover biomedical and psychological research. It is
clear that the authors never imagined a day that not just
researchers, but most members of our society would have
desktop computers containing personal information cre-
ated by thousands of individuals with whom we have no
direct relationship.
The penalties for performing research without approval
include forced termination of research and loss of fund-
ing: we ignore the rules at our own peril. But in the long
term, society would be better served with broader exemp-
tions that could be automatically applied by researchers
without going to an IRB.
Revisions to the Common Rule should also address a
particularly wasteful practice: the intentional destruction
of data which was collected without IRB approval: this
practice certainly seems to violate the Belmont Report’s
“respect for persons” principle.
The Common Rule was created because of abuses in
medical and psychological research, but the Rule was very
broadly written. If it cannot be revised or reinterpreted,
the impact on computer security research may be severe.
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